Richard Haas is a foreign policy expert. For years, he was president of the Counculmon Foreign Relations from 2003 to 2023. Before that, he was director of policy planning for the U.S. State Department.

He titled his post “Defeat.”

He wrote:

Welcome to Home & Away. The big news again is the Iran War, as we now have the memorandum of understanding (MOU) agreed to and signed by the United States and Iran. Here are the main provisions:

— The two governments have committed to an immediate and permanent ceasefire, including Lebanon.

— The two agree not to interfere in each other’s internal affairs.

— The two will seek to negotiate a final deal within 60 days, but this can be extended if need be, as is virtually certain to be the case.

— The Strait of Hormuz will reopen as the United States has pledged to end its blockade and Iran has agreed to allow the resumption of shipping.

— The Iranian government has (again) agreed not to procure or develop nuclear weapons. More significantly, it has agreed to maintain the nuclear status quo while all nuclear-related issues are being negotiated. Nothing in the MOU prejudices, one way or the other, the future status of the stock of enriched uranium in Iran, new enrichment-related activities, or inspections.

— Financial assets will flow to Iran as all economic sanctions are eased and frozen assets are released. A $300 billion reconstruction fund will be established for Iran.

— Nothing is mentioned about Iranian conventional military forces (including missiles and drones) or support for proxies such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis.

Obviously, much remains to be negotiated (particularly in the nuclear realm) and implemented when it comes to the Strait and just about everything else. We will see whether the end of the war is temporary or permanent, as declared.

What is clear, though, is that the emerging deal constitutes a massive victory for Iran, or, more precisely, for its government. The regime will receive a financial windfall that will strengthen its hold on the country and help it rearm itself and its proxies. In just two months, it can impose tolls and quite possibly other controls affecting the use of the Strait of Hormuz.

The same cannot be said about Iran’s people, who are among the war’s principal losers. The regime is not just more radical; it now has the prestige of having successfully stood up to the Great Satan. As already noted, it will be bailed out financially. Plus, the United States has pledged not to interfere in Iran’s internal affairs, which is a 180-degree reversal of its initial stance of seeking regime change. There is no reason to expect repression to ease, although at some point Iran’s leaders will have to confront their questionable priorities and policies that have driven the country to economic ruin.

Israel is another big loser in the war, as its relationship with the United States, already strained by Gaza, has deteriorated sharply. (Prime Minister Netanyahu’s relationship with Trump has deteriorated as well.) Israel’s main concerns (Iran’s missiles and aid to proxies) are unaffected by the MOU. It remains to be seen whether Israel’s nuclear-related concerns are met (safe to say they will not be met in full, as at most there will be a JCPOA-like ceiling placed on Iran’s nuclear program, not its elimination). Iran’s pledge not to procure or develop nuclear weapons is simply a statement of intentions that has no effect on capabilities. Worse yet for Israel, it finds itself under increased pressure to pull back in Lebanon and may experience the same vis-à-vis Gaza – and it is far from clear that the Trump administration won’t add to the pressure.

The Arab countries of the region also come out worse off, as they will have to contend with an emboldened, strengthened, and more radical Iran, one with newfound power derived from its demonstrated willingness and ability to interfere with the Strait of Hormuz and attack its neighbors. The war also showed they will have to deal with Iran largely on their own, as neither the United States nor Israel can protect them. I expect several will decide the better part of valor is to reach an accommodation with Iran.

The result reinforces the view (which I have held since before the war was launched) that this war was a strategic error of the first magnitude. There was no imminent threat that justified the decision to initiate the war, and there were better options (above all, diplomacy and increased sanctions) available to pursue U.S. aims. The result was a misguided war of choice, predicated on flawed assumptions about Iran held by officials with little expertise or experience, a war that predictably turned out badly for the United States and its partners in the region and beyond.

The United States has paid a great deal to return the Strait of Hormuz to its previous status – and what will result will fall short of that. Nuclear arrangements remain up in the air, but it is certain Iran will remain active in that domain (especially given the leverage this war has given the regime). Inspections will be as critical as they are likely to be challenging. The war introduced new strains into U.S. ties with regional partners and allies, in the process isolating the United States more than Iran. Respect for the United States, both for its judgment and competence, is much diminished.

Bret Stephens is right to term the war a debacle. But he and others are wrong in suggesting that if only the president had used more military force (including ground troops) for longer the result would have been different. Actually, it would have been different, but not for the better. Odds are we would have found ourselves caught in a quagmire of our own making, losing many more troops and churning through far more equipment in the process.

The commitment might well have taken years to play out, and even then, there would have been no guarantee of success given the tens of millions of Iranians who still support this regime and the many more who might have rallied to the regime against the foreign occupier. It would have created a strategic distraction and a political and economic nightmare. The best and perhaps only good thing to say about the deal just reached with Iran is that the United States cut its losses.