I heard an interesting discussion on Terri Gross’ “Fresh Air” on NPR with the filmmakers of a documentary called “The Spymasters.” The filmmakers, two French brothers, happened to have been in the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, making a film about a firefighter’s life. The new documentary is about the CIA and its role in dealing with terrorism. It appears until 12/26 on Showtime on demand (free). The film consists of interviews with 12 former directors of the CIA and some retired counterterrorism personnel.
I watched it and found it a fair and balanced discussion. I read the 9/11 report when it was published and was reminded that the CIA found Bin Ladin during the Clinton administration, but was stopped from attacking him because of Attorney General Janet Reno’s objections. She wanted him captured, not killed. Bin Ladin had already claimed credit for the bombings of two American embassies in Africa that killed a large number of people, as well as other deadly attacks.
George Tenet said that the agency became very alarmed about an impending attack on the U.S. in the summer of 2001. He said he called for an emergency meeting with Condoleeza Rice and President Bush in July 2001 and briefed them. After the meeting, nothing happened. Later Rice wrote that she ignored the meeting because she heard threats every day. Tenet made clear that this was no ordinary briefing or warning but a belief that an attack was imminent. But nothing happened.
Tenet also reviewed what the CIA knew about Iraq. He says that the CIA believed Iraq had “weapons of mass destruction,” as did other intelligence services. But he also said that the CIA did not support the invasion of Iraq, as there was no evidence that Iraq was tied to 9/11. He implies–loudly–that Iraq was a diversion from what he thought was a successful strategy of driving the Taliban out of Afghanistan and pursuing Bin Laden.
There is a lengthy discussion of torture–when and if it is ever justified–and drone strikes.
The documentary raises important questions about the role of the CIA and doesn’t answer them. These are questions we should all think about.
Diane Ravitch's blog 
Two bits says the documentary is the work of the CIA.
Read William Blum’s “Killing Hope” to learn about the CIA!
But maybe you’re the CIA!
YEP!
Cognoscenti Ignorante Ano-humano
Es Una Nube…
Y me han enviado muchas nubes, hoy!
You repeatedly typed 2011 when I think you meant 2001.
Steve, YOu are right. Thanks for the correction. I got 2 out of 3 dates wrong. I fixed them.
The CIA does not recommend policy. It is a taboo in the agency. The CIA would not have recommended what to do re Iraq.
In June and July 2001 the CIA, the FBI, and other agencies were reporting that Al Qaeda was planning a major attack but had no details on who, when, how or where. Tenet met with Bush almost everyday to give the daily intelligence briefing, and Rice was usual at those meetings. See http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report_Ch8.htm
Does the film talk about why Saudi Arabia was spared in all these discussions? After all, 79% of the 911 terrorists were from Saudi Arabia (none from Afghanistan or Iraq).
No need to! The Bushies and the Saudi Royal family are bestest bosom buddies.
“But he also said that the CIA did not support the invasion of Iraq, as there was no evidence that Iraq was tied to 9/11.”
Indeed, the Bush administration did not blame Saddam for the 9/11 attacks. Rather the 9/11 attacks raised the threat evaluation for the combination of Saddam’s continuing material breach of the terrorism and WMD mandates of the Gulf War ceasefire.
To set the record straight, see the explanation of the law and policy, fact basis for Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Excerpt from the preface:
“Here is my latest attempt to set the record straight on Operation Iraqi Freedom by synthesizing the primary sources of the mission, including the Gulf War ceasefire UN Security Council resolutions that set the “governing standard of Iraqi compliance” (UNSCR 1441), the US law and policy to “bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations” (P.L. 105-235), the conditions and precedents that set the stage for OIF, and the determinative fact findings of Iraq’s breach of ceasefire that triggered enforcement, to explain the law and policy, fact basis – i.e., the why – of the decision for OIF.”